Wednesday, May 27, 2020
Sunday, May 24, 2020
Republicans, Predators, and the Pandemic
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Friday, May 22, 2020
Thursday, May 21, 2020
Saturday, May 16, 2020
How Private Equity Bankrupt J.C. Penny
David Dayen, American Prospect
Century-old retailer JCPenney filed for bankruptcy late on Friday, the latest large retailer to succumb this year. And you could hear private equity fund managers breathing a sigh of relief. Unlike J.Crew and Neiman Marcus, JCPenney is a publicly traded company. At least private equity wouldn’t be called out for this retail bankruptcy, and maybe that could absolve them of the high debt loads and mismanagement that has driven much of the retail apocalypse. If public and private firms are equally at risk, maybe the sector’s just obsolete.
First of all, you can’t cherry-pick one company and absolve the failed PE business model. According to the Wall Street Journal, 27 of the 38 retailers with the “weakest credit profiles” are private equity-owned. The incredible debt burden placed on these firms made them inflexible amid industry changes. And that was JCPenney’s problem too; its downfall mirrored the tell-tale signs of a private equity portfolio company.
Back in 2010, hedge fund titan Bill Ackman and real estate investor Vornado bought a quarter of JCPenney stock, and vowed to turn around the company. They effectively installed a new CEO, Ron Johnson, who subsequently ran JCPenney completely into the ground. He brought in his own inexperienced managers, fired 19,000 workers in cost-cutting measures, and reorganized the stores without market testing. Sales dropped 25 percent in a year and by 2012 Johnson was fired. Ackman and Vornado sold out and took losses. Private equity circled around the company, hinting at a purchase. But there was a problem: it was already weighed down by too much debt.
By 2013, JCPenney had $1.9 billion in net debt. And a loan from Goldman Sachsadded another $1.75 billion. In other words, it was already acting like a private equity-held company, using debt to survive. Like its private equity-owned colleagues, JCPenney went into conserve-cash mode, shunning investments in the business. This made it impossible to adapt and build an enduring presence online as e-commerce grew. The company also sold off real estate, stripping assets out to feed the debt machine.
Century-old retailer JCPenney filed for bankruptcy late on Friday, the latest large retailer to succumb this year. And you could hear private equity fund managers breathing a sigh of relief. Unlike J.Crew and Neiman Marcus, JCPenney is a publicly traded company. At least private equity wouldn’t be called out for this retail bankruptcy, and maybe that could absolve them of the high debt loads and mismanagement that has driven much of the retail apocalypse. If public and private firms are equally at risk, maybe the sector’s just obsolete.
First of all, you can’t cherry-pick one company and absolve the failed PE business model. According to the Wall Street Journal, 27 of the 38 retailers with the “weakest credit profiles” are private equity-owned. The incredible debt burden placed on these firms made them inflexible amid industry changes. And that was JCPenney’s problem too; its downfall mirrored the tell-tale signs of a private equity portfolio company.
Back in 2010, hedge fund titan Bill Ackman and real estate investor Vornado bought a quarter of JCPenney stock, and vowed to turn around the company. They effectively installed a new CEO, Ron Johnson, who subsequently ran JCPenney completely into the ground. He brought in his own inexperienced managers, fired 19,000 workers in cost-cutting measures, and reorganized the stores without market testing. Sales dropped 25 percent in a year and by 2012 Johnson was fired. Ackman and Vornado sold out and took losses. Private equity circled around the company, hinting at a purchase. But there was a problem: it was already weighed down by too much debt.
By 2013, JCPenney had $1.9 billion in net debt. And a loan from Goldman Sachsadded another $1.75 billion. In other words, it was already acting like a private equity-held company, using debt to survive. Like its private equity-owned colleagues, JCPenney went into conserve-cash mode, shunning investments in the business. This made it impossible to adapt and build an enduring presence online as e-commerce grew. The company also sold off real estate, stripping assets out to feed the debt machine.
But that debt mountain grew to $4 billion amid falling sales, and the coronavirus crisis tipped the company over the edge. It started skipping interest payments and the end was nigh. There are still 85,000 employees, most of them on the floor in sales and support. At least 200 stores will likely be shuttered.
After bankruptcy, JCPenney might finally become the attractive, debt-light company that private equity would want to play their turnaround game. It could find itself at the beginning of a new asset-stripping cycle, to the benefit of new private equity owners. The fear is that discounted, hobbled firms would get swallowed up into the PE borg, giving financiers an easy way to extend dominance.
But private equity may not be in the position to capitalize right now. Its portfolio companies keep going under or are considering bankruptcy. Major firms like KKRand Apollo have reported big losses. Valuations are impossible, given the uncertainty of reopening and returning sales. Selling companies, consequently, can’t happen. The federal government has supplied surprisingly little relief, although the Federal Reserve money cannon could still come to the rescue by purchasing junk bonds.
Private equity has lots of money in reserve for deals, and some have been dipping into that. But whether there will be enough appetite to take on companies like JCPenney is an open question. Meanwhile, we can say pretty definitively that the private equity business model adds hidden risk that can be incredibly damaging in a crisis. Where the valie lies is another question.
Friday, May 15, 2020
Thursday, May 14, 2020
Sunday, May 10, 2020
Tuesday, May 5, 2020
Trump Prepares for 134,000 Deaths
A Grim Viewpoint
I don’t think it takes a savant to figure out what’s going on here. The IHME model was just wrong, we were about to hit the number of deaths it predicted for three months from now, and it recognized its error by tweaking a dial. Though it did hold out that its projections “reflect the effect of premature relaxations on restrictions,” a convenient alibi for a model that was already out of date.
The CDC model is a more appropriate manifestation of what we’ve been talking about here. The country is pulling back on lockdowns while stuck at a peak on deaths and cases. In fact, because aggregating a large country with one curve is completely misleading, the pullback is happening while peaking is still going on. If you remove New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, where cases spiked early, you see a curve that goes down slightly in the middle of April, causing everyone to relax, and then starts its way up again.
No other country has given the go sign to its population under these conditions. Countries around the world are starting to return and there appears to be some jealousy or mass delusion that we’re in the same position. We’re not and we never were. In fact Italy’s relaxation of the lockdown looks a lot like our lockdown. Having blown February by botching testing, we’re on the precipice of blowing March and April by re-opening far too soon. Even California, seen as the responsible actor in this play, is dropping restrictions (albeit not many), doing its part to put the country on a bad trajectory. The signals are all in the direction of placating protesters and putting America back in an incredibly dangerous position.
So the CDC is adapting to circumstances like the IHME model, though in a more responsible fashion. It shows a ramp-up about two weeks from now, matching the beginning of the lockdown relaxations. This isn’t a second wave but the second half of a first wave that merely plateaued but never ended.
The Washington Post talked to the creator of the model, who disavowed knowing how the data was being used, but who helpfully explained that he was basing his decisions in the model on “reopening scenarios” that “could get out of control very quickly.”
This likelihood, by the way, is the worst possible outcome. Reopening and then seeing cases and hospitalizations that will overwhelm the system again, leading to another closure, would be worse for public health and worse for the economy.
The White House is sticking with a model made by their economist Kevin Hassett, who once predicted the Dow Jones Industrial Average would reach 36,000. (It hasn’t.) He’s using a “cubic” model which might as well be called a “fit the numbers to Donald Trump’s re-election plans” model. We’re seeing in real time a battle between epidemiologists and economists over predicting the future. Epidemiologists are catching up to limited data and reworking on the fly; economists are lying to flatter their bosses and ignoring reality.
If you really play out what the CDC model is showing, it gets you to half a million deaths by the end of the summer. You have to conclude, because what’s happening is so obvious, that this is an acceptable level of death to the president and his staff. They are fine with mass death in America. They have always been fine with mass death in America; we let mass murderers get guns, after all. They would rather have mass death than pay for unemployment benefits for too long. Their entire strategy throughout April was to figure out the best way to allow mass death, in service to the economy. This was a false choice, incidentally; we will have mass death and an obliterated economy. And when that happens, the only straw left to grasp will be the culture war.
Anyone working in the federal government on pandemic response right now who doesn’t want to be known historically as a mass murderer should probably resign.
First Response
David Dayen
Everyone is trying to make sense of the leaked CDC model that shows coronavirus deaths peaking at 3,000 per day, 70 percent more than the current plateau, and a whopping 200,000 new cases every day as well. The noted IHME model out of the University of Washington doubled as well, now predicting more than 134,000 deaths by August after sitting on 70,000 for a while.I don’t think it takes a savant to figure out what’s going on here. The IHME model was just wrong, we were about to hit the number of deaths it predicted for three months from now, and it recognized its error by tweaking a dial. Though it did hold out that its projections “reflect the effect of premature relaxations on restrictions,” a convenient alibi for a model that was already out of date.
The CDC model is a more appropriate manifestation of what we’ve been talking about here. The country is pulling back on lockdowns while stuck at a peak on deaths and cases. In fact, because aggregating a large country with one curve is completely misleading, the pullback is happening while peaking is still going on. If you remove New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, where cases spiked early, you see a curve that goes down slightly in the middle of April, causing everyone to relax, and then starts its way up again.
No other country has given the go sign to its population under these conditions. Countries around the world are starting to return and there appears to be some jealousy or mass delusion that we’re in the same position. We’re not and we never were. In fact Italy’s relaxation of the lockdown looks a lot like our lockdown. Having blown February by botching testing, we’re on the precipice of blowing March and April by re-opening far too soon. Even California, seen as the responsible actor in this play, is dropping restrictions (albeit not many), doing its part to put the country on a bad trajectory. The signals are all in the direction of placating protesters and putting America back in an incredibly dangerous position.
So the CDC is adapting to circumstances like the IHME model, though in a more responsible fashion. It shows a ramp-up about two weeks from now, matching the beginning of the lockdown relaxations. This isn’t a second wave but the second half of a first wave that merely plateaued but never ended.
The Washington Post talked to the creator of the model, who disavowed knowing how the data was being used, but who helpfully explained that he was basing his decisions in the model on “reopening scenarios” that “could get out of control very quickly.”
This likelihood, by the way, is the worst possible outcome. Reopening and then seeing cases and hospitalizations that will overwhelm the system again, leading to another closure, would be worse for public health and worse for the economy.
The White House is sticking with a model made by their economist Kevin Hassett, who once predicted the Dow Jones Industrial Average would reach 36,000. (It hasn’t.) He’s using a “cubic” model which might as well be called a “fit the numbers to Donald Trump’s re-election plans” model. We’re seeing in real time a battle between epidemiologists and economists over predicting the future. Epidemiologists are catching up to limited data and reworking on the fly; economists are lying to flatter their bosses and ignoring reality.
If you really play out what the CDC model is showing, it gets you to half a million deaths by the end of the summer. You have to conclude, because what’s happening is so obvious, that this is an acceptable level of death to the president and his staff. They are fine with mass death in America. They have always been fine with mass death in America; we let mass murderers get guns, after all. They would rather have mass death than pay for unemployment benefits for too long. Their entire strategy throughout April was to figure out the best way to allow mass death, in service to the economy. This was a false choice, incidentally; we will have mass death and an obliterated economy. And when that happens, the only straw left to grasp will be the culture war.
Anyone working in the federal government on pandemic response right now who doesn’t want to be known historically as a mass murderer should probably resign.
It’s Workers Who Should Determine When Their Workplace Is Safe
It’s Workers Who Should Determine When Their Workplace Is Safe: States must create health and safety councils—one way that ‘essential’ workers can begin to gain one essential they lack: power.
Friday, May 1, 2020
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